


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THE FIRST YEAR OF THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY

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THE FIRST YEAR OF THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY

The government of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel, which has just completed its first year in office, is stronger today than when elected and is exuding a new air of optimism in its approach to the country's outstanding problems. During the past year, it has come a long way in re-establishing confidence among the people in the government, a confidence badly damaged by more than five years of political instability following the 1960 revolution. Nevertheless, the government continues to face the problems of a developing economy, a determined opposition, and other more hostile political forces, some of which still doubt the viability of democracy in Turkey. In particular, an unleashed political left is bent on drastically modifying US-Turkish relations.

Accomplishments Thus Far

The Justice Party (JP) government, led by 41-year-old Suleyman Demirel, came to power following an overwhelming victory in the October 1965 national elections. Although it succeeded in passing only two significant bills last year, it is confident of greater achievement during the new legislative session which began on 1 November and has an ambitious program--259 bills--ready for consideration.

The government now is in a somewhat stronger position than a year ago. It has since gained a majority in the Senate (see table on next page), giving it control of both houses and has also gained substantial control of the bureaucracy. Demirel also has reached a sound working relationship with the military leaders, who formerly opposed any government by the JP, which is the political heir of the Democratic Party they ousted in 1960. More-

over, Demirel's political opposition is divided, and his government seems to have widespread public support for its economic development program. The regime has also succeeded in broadening Turkey's foreign relations without, so far, compromising its basic Western orientation.

Demirel is becoming an able and discerning politician, despite his seeming blunder last year in seeking priority passage of two highly controversial pieces of legislation--a revised electoral law and an amnesty bill. The government finally shelved the electoral law indefinitely after a lengthy opposition filibuster. The latter bill provided total amnesty--except for the right to hold public office--for all political prisoners convicted following the revolution of 1960, and it reduced the sentences of those involved in the 1963 coup attempt. Its passage in the final days of the legislative session was the first major legislative

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	SENATE			NATIONAL ASSEMBLY		
	JAN 1964	OCT 1965	NOV 1966	JAN 1964	OCT 1965	NOV 1966
Justice Party (JP)	57	79	94	147	239	243
Republican Peoples Party (RPP)	34	48	49	175	134	135
Nation Party (NP)	5	2	2	13	31	27
New Turkey Party (NTP)	13	8	1	44	19	18
Turkish Labor Party (TLP)	1	0	1	0	15	14
Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP)	8	4	1	25	11	9
Independents	27	6	2	37	-	3
Vacancies	5	3	0	9	1	1
	(Total: 150 seats*)			(Total: 450 seats)		

*Excluding 20 "Life Senators" and 15 presidential appointees

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victory of the Demirel government, and fulfilled one of the party's main campaign promises.

Demirel, despite his popular strength, lacks the support, or even the acquiescence, of the self-styled "alert forces"--the intellectuals, the students, the press, and elements of the bureaucracy and the armed forces. These groups include the traditional supporters of the major opposition Republican Peoples Party (RPP) headed by the venerable former prime minister Ismet Inonu and those who are adherents to the new socialist trend in Turkey. They tend to regard themselves as guardians of the national wel-

fare with historical claims superior to those of the majority. The JP stresses the supremacy of the national will and argues that the only legitimate government is the one chosen by the majority in a free election.

President Sunay, former chief of the General Staff, recently aligned himself with this JP position, possibly as a warning that the military leaders are not presently in sympathy with any revolutionary ideas harbored by the "alert forces." Nonetheless, debate over these views will continue, at least informally. This presents a situation made to order for exploitation by the political

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left best typified by the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) headed by Mehmet Ali Aybar, who was arrested in 1953 for Communist activities.

Demirel will remain on trial during the coming year. He must gain complete control of the lethargic administrative machinery of government. He is already convinced of the danger of overreacting to criticism, and appears determined not to make the same mistakes that led to the downfall in 1960--and later execution by the military government--of prime minister Menderes. Demirel's government must promote a new vigor in the national economy in a way that will sustain the confidence of the people and especially the business community.

Democracy is likewise on trial. In the face of the influential RPP-oriented minority which believes it knows best what is good for Turkey and that it

should rule in Turkey regardless of the popular will. Demirel must prove that his thesis of the "national will" is the right choice for Turkey.

Demirel and His Government

Demirel uses his own humble beginnings to explain his faith in democracy for Turkey. He relates himself to the people and their problems and professes a great faith in their vitality and capacity. Demirel--an engineer by profession--is basically a technocrat, having been general director of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) before the revolution and as such gaining a reputation for honesty and able administration. He is also recognized as a better-than-average economist, and is a firm believer in the free enterprise system. He helped prepare Turkey's first five-year economic plan 1963-67 and has visited the US twice--in 1949 and 1950 as an AID grantee and again in 1954 and 1955 as the first Turk to receive an Eisenhower exchange scholarship.

It was not until 1962 that Demirel gained any important stature in policies. His choice as president general of the JP in 1964 was widely acclaimed as a triumph for its moderate faction and was regarded as improving the party acceptability to the military leadership. The JP under Demirel won election in 1965 on a platform associating Turkey with the West and favoring increased private investment.

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The Demirel government has remained substantially unchanged during its first year. The prime minister, however, has been under considerable pressure within the JP to make several new appointments. Largely for political reasons, he has postponed such a move until after the party's national convention--scheduled for 27-30 November--in order to avoid opposition on the convention floor. The anticipated changes are not expected to represent any change in policy.

Demirel's greatest accomplishment has been winning the confidence, cooperation, and support of the military high command. The finesse with which he handled the delicate circumstances surrounding the presidential transition from the incapacitated General Cemal Gursel to General Cevdet Sunay drew widespread admiration. Sunay's selection as president in late March 1966 offered public proof of the rapprochement between the JP and the military high command.

Deficiencies

Demirel's regime is weak in several areas. It is short of technically and administratively qualified personnel, thus limiting Demirel's ability to reform the civil service. The opposition, though disunited, is strong and there is continued evidence of dissension among the lower echelons of the military. The inventory of problems also includes the perennial Cyprus dispute, increasing concern over the Kurdish minority, increasing leftist activities, an upsurge of

anti-Americanism, and a budgetary deficit.

The underlying political tension and the incipient military unease probably were the most persistent sources of concern during the past year. There were times when the opposition appeared determined to provoke military intervention. Early in the year, lengthy debates over the thorny Cyprus issue and over adoption of the annual budget, plus a filibuster over the electoral bill, produced an acrimonious atmosphere in the assembly and for a time threatened to develop into a full-scale crisis. Although there were reports of new plotting within the military, the opposition, which was promoting the crisis atmosphere, apparently realized that it stood to lose as much as the JP from military intervention in government affairs. In any event, the political atmosphere was not conducive to another revolution at this time.

While the Turkish political scene now appears generally calm, and Demirel and opposition leader Inonu have even been observed recently arm in arm, the underlying tension among the political forces still exists. The deep split in Turkey's political life was demonstrated recently by the highly partisan press treatment of the death of former president Gursel on the anniversary of the execution of former prime minister Menderes. Some people even alleged it was retribution. To some extent the aura of the 27 May 1960 revolution remains the touchstone of political identity

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in Turkey. Representatives of the RPP have indicated that, during the current session of parliament, they will continue to emphasize the importance of the revolution and guide their action accordingly.

Former president Bayar, jailed after the 1960 revolution, but given a presidential amnesty last July because of age and ill health, is also apparently trying to reinject his influence into the political scene. There were even reports that he had given the word to dump Demirel, but there is no evidence that he has the influence to accomplish such a feat. Demirel accords Bayar a certain prestige as a senior citizen and former government leader and meets with him from time to time, but there is no evidence that Bayar has any influence on Demirel's decisions.

Demirel and the Military

The Demirel regime has the general sanction of the military high command, but political extremists of both left and right have their sympathizers in military circles. This has been exploited by the opposition to deepen antiregime sentiment and drive a wedge between the military leaders and the lower echelons of the armed forces.

Some of the "life senators" --former members of the military Committee of National Union (CNU) that engineered the 1960 revolution--have tried to fan the sparks of dissension with the ultimate goal of unseating the

government. Since the senatorial elections last June, there has also been a campaign by the opposition press against selected military leaders designed to alienate the body of the military from its top leadership.

If the junior officers can be convinced that the high command has thrown in its lot with the JP, they may be encouraged to attempt another coup patterned after the abortive 1962-63 attempt led by retired Colonel Aydemir, who was executed for his efforts. There is also some danger that General Tural, the chief of the General Staff and his associates might generate politically unwise countermeasures against the opposition which could lead to increasing unrest.

For example, the Turkish National Security Council is reported to have decided recently to take action against the leftist press, especially those elements attacking the military. Plans are currently being drawn up to implement this decision.

Economic Accomplishments

The economic accomplishments of the Demirel regime have been more impressive than its legislative record.

Economic activity in Turkey, on the upswing since 1964, experienced a sharp rise during the past year. Industrial production has increased markedly agricultural production is expected to reach record levels, due in part to above-average rainfall, and the over-all

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HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO AND FROM TURKEY DURING 1966

TO TURKEY

Feb	Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi
May	Pakistani Parliamentary Delegation UAR Cultural Delegation
July	Iraqi Prime Minister Bazzaz West German Foreign Minister Schroeder Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani Rumanian Premier Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu
Aug	Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Pato'ichev
Aug-Sept	Saudi Arabian King Faysal
Sept	Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal
Oct	South Korean Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won Moroccan King Hassan
Nov	UAR Deputy Foreign Minister al-Feki
Dec	Soviet Premier Kosygin

FROM TURKEY

Mar	Foreign Office Secretary General Bayulken to UAR
Apr-May	Parliamentary Delegations to Saudi Arabia, Rumania, West Germany, and several Far East countries
May	Foreign Minister Caglayangil to Iraq
July	Foreign Office Delegation to Albania
Jul-Aug	Parliamentary Delegation to Bulgaria
Aug	Parliamentary Delegation to Bulgaria
Sept	Parliamentary Delegation to Poland Foreign Minister Caglayangil to US and UN
Oct	President Sunay to Iran and Pakistan
Dec	President Sunay to Tunisia

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increase in the gross national product is expected to be close to 8.4 percent as compared with the 7 percent target set by the development plan. During the first nine months of 1966, private foreign investment almost doubled the total amount invested in either 1964 or 1965. For the first time in several years, the World Bank has made a direct loan to Turkey, reflecting greater confidence in Turkey's economic future.

The new upsurge of confidence among the Turkish business community resulted largely from a major publicity campaign by the government, including stumping tours this past summer by Prime Minister Demirel, President Sunay, and other government officials. Demirel claimed that the government is currently working on nearly 600 projects and that investments during the second five-year plan (1968-72) are expected to exceed \$10 billion. Major new projects include a new petrochemical plant in western Turkey and the Keban Dam on the Euphrates River in eastern Turkey. The government plans to triple both cement and electric power production, to double the country's oil refinery capacity, and to build a new copper complex, an aluminum plant, and a paper-making plant.

Soviet aid will be utilized for some of these projects under a protocol signed in November 1965. The protocol covers seven new industrial projects. These include a plant to produce vodka. A sulfuric acid plant is scheduled for completion in 1969 on a Soviet credit of \$4.4 million which is to be repaid by Turkish exports to the USSR over a 15-year period.

Foreign Relations

The Demirel regime remains firmly committed to Turkey's Western orientation and its ties to NATO and CENTO, but it has been subjected to strong opposition pressure to assume a more independent stance based primarily on Turkey's national self-interest.

This pressure, which reflects latent xenophobia and deep frustration over Cyprus, has caused an increase in anti-Americanism, marked by press attacks, demonstrations, insults, and open animosity and has led to restrictions of US military activity in Turkey. The tone of the propaganda, which has included exploitation of forged documents, suggests Communist participation. Recent demonstrations in Ankara and Adana may indicate that the US will soon face a new wave of anti-Americanism, particularly now that parliament is back in session.

The Demirel government has been promoting what has been termed a "foreign policy with a personality." The year has been marked by an unusually large number of contacts with the leaders of other countries--probably more than during any comparable period in modern Turkish history. In these exchange visits, the regime has tried to demonstrate its ability to broaden relations outside NATO and CENTO. In recent months the government has expanded Turkey's bilateral relations with the Arab states and the countries of Eastern Europe and has indicated its intention to establish closer ties with the new states of Africa.

The continuing dialogue on the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece has eased criticism of the government's handling of

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this dispute. Nonetheless, the opposition has indicated that Cyprus will probably become a major subject for debate during the upcoming general discussion of the budget for next year. The opposition wants to know more about what has been said during the highly secretive discussions over the past few months.

On Vietnam, the most that can be said is that the government has expressed sympathy for the people of South Vietnam who are struggling against Communism. The Turkish press is divided on the issue, with the leftist-influenced newspapers condemning the US action in Vietnam. The government has given its general moral and political support of US policy on Vietnam, but military support is not being contemplated at this time.

In general, the Demirel government's foreign policy has increased the country's stature abroad and has been popular at

home even though there is a growing popular demand for a more flexible and independent foreign policy which would lessen Turkey's dependence on the US. Most of these critics, however, want Turkey to maintain its Western orientation, although the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and some rightist elements tend to favor a more neutralist policy. Meanwhile, NATO remains the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey continues to support the US on all basic East-West issues. Turkey recently requested a major review of bilateral US-Turkish mutual security arrangements and the sizable US presence and investment in Turkey may have to be reduced or at least brought under closer Turkish supervision.

Sunay as President

Cevdet Sunay, who resigned as chief of the Turkish General Staff to become President of Turkey in March 1966, is basically anti-Communist, pro-NATO, and pro-US. He is Turkey's most respected military leader, and lends much prestige to the government. Sunay regards himself as a needed stabilizing factor in the current political situation.

Under the terms of the constitution, the presidency is largely a ceremonial nonpolitical office with little power except through personal influence. The president has the authority to delay legislation but does not have a veto.

In his few months in office, General Sunay has adapted exceedingly well and is demonstrating considerable political acumen.

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He has toured the provinces to "meet the people" and hear their problems and has in every instance been well received. He has thus served as a useful channel for bringing urgent problems to the attention of the government. Sunay appears to be enjoying the experience and has already adopted the appealing air and attitude of a campaigning politician.

The opposition, however, has strongly criticized Sunay for traveling in the company of JP ministers. They claim that this compromises his apolitical role. Other critics have pointed to selection of a general for the presidency as proof that Turkey has not yet returned to normal since the 1960 revolution.

Sunay apparently intends to be an active president in both domestic affairs and in foreign relations. He has already visited Iran and Pakistan and will visit the US in the near future. Sunay sees his primary task, however, as preventing partisan political rivalries in Turkey from endangering political stability.

The President's relations with Prime Minister Demirel and the JP government generally appear satisfactory; and the transition to the new President has developed smoothly. As time passes and Sunay becomes more involved in the political arena, his influence in military circles may lessen. On the other hand, as he becomes more informed on Turkey's foreign and domestic

problems, his influence within the government will probably increase. As President, Sunay also has prestige as the commander in chief of the armed forces, but the real command rests with General Cemal Tural, Sunay's successor as chief of the General Staff.

Although Sunay believes that ideally the military should remain aloof from Turkish politics, he does not expect this to be a practical possibility for many years. Somewhat less democratic-minded than Demirel, Sunay tends to view the peasants and urban workers as too naive, the wealthy classes as too shortsighted, and the intelligentsia as too irresponsible to be left entirely alone. He therefore regards the military as the only cohesive force with the necessary dedication to duty and experience in leadership to keep Turkey on an even keel in times of real crisis.

Sunay and Demirel share a mutual respect and appear to be a good team. Much now depends on Sunay's ability to keep a tight rein on the military and on Demirel's ability to keep the government from becoming bogged down on partisan issues.

Outlook

Prime Minister Demirel is confident that the JP will remain in power a long time if it can overcome financial and economic problems during 1967. This will not be an easy task, although the economic outlook, based on continued financial support from

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the "international consortium," appears to be quite favorable.

Key issues facing the new parliament include: the perennial Cyprus question, with some indication that the opposition will make Cyprus a prime foreign policy topic; the government's handling of the earthquake-devastated area in eastern Turkey; and the American presence in Turkey. In general the opposition, despite considerable internal dissension, probably will unite in its "total" confrontation of the JP. Demirel, however, has acquired considerable confidence during his first year in office, and he is unlikely to be cowed.

During the past year, the JP devoted most of its efforts to consolidating its political position and in planning for Turkey's future development. The legislative year just begun will probably be a year of testing and further economic progress, provided the government can keep opposition, obstruction, and leftist agitation to a minimum. The new parliamentary session got under way on 1 November in an at-

mosphere of "tense expectancy," with Cyprus and the US-Turkish bilateral agreements probably slated for early debate.

In the coming months the JP will continue to be challenged by the influential urban elite and its confederates in the press and by the universities and among the lower echelons of the military. These groups, which support the opposition RPP, remain deeply frustrated by their poor prospects for returning to power through free elections any time soon. They feel compelled, therefore, to try to promote the downfall of the present regime by "extraparliamentary" means. Probably the strongest factor operating against such a development, however, is their realization that all Turkish political parties would suffer in the event of a new military intervention. However, barring some major breakdown in public order, an extended legislative impasse, or a renunciation of the 1960 revolution, the military will probably remain "in their barracks" content to assert continuing influence through the high command and President Sunay. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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